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100 | 1 |
_aBARON, David P _929692 |
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245 | 1 | 0 | _aComparative dynamics of parliamentary governments |
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_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cSeptember 1998 |
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520 | 3 | _aFormal theories of parliamentary governments typically focus on the formation and duration of governments. This focus reflects the fundamental characteristic of such systems that the government is installed by and continues under the confidence of the parliament. Under this confidence relationship the government exercises effective control of the agenda-setting process in the legislature, and the legislation enacted by the parliament then follows from the program of the government. Changing circumstances and exogenous events, however, can disrupt this relationship and result in government termination, which requires either the formation of a new government or an unscheduled election. This article presents a dynamic theory of parliamentary government with an emphasis on government formation, legislation, and termination under alternative institutional confidence relationships. | |
773 | 0 | 8 |
_tAmerican Political Science Review _g92, 3, p. 593-610 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, September 1998 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w |
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_a20070105 _b1430^b _cNatália |
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_a20070105 _b1715^b _cNatália |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21238 _d21238 |
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041 | _aeng |