000			01591naa a2200181uu 4500
001			7010514354621
003			OSt
005			20220414103258.0
008			070105s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_921985 _aSmith, Alastair
245	1	0	_aInternational crises and domestic politics
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cSeptember 1998
520	3		_aIn 1990, prior to the Gulf War, President Bush made explicit foreign policy statements regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In short, he threatened Saddam Hussein. When this failed to cow Hussein into withdrawing, Bush followed through on his threats and authorized force to remove the Iraqi army from Kuwait. By comparison, U.S. policy toward Bosnia was less direct. Both presidents Bush and Clinton adopted vague, ambiguous policies toward the Bosnian crisis, and U.S. intervention was limited. Potentially, Clinton could have used direct military force to lift the siege of Sarajevo, but he neither pursued this strategy nor threatened to do so. Sometimes threats carry the weight of direct action. For example, Clinton outlined the contingent circumstances under which he would authorize military intervention in Haiti; just before the announced deadline, the Haitian military junta relinquished power, alleviating the need for military force.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g92, 3, p. 623-638 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, September 1998 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070105 _b1435^b _cNatália
998			_a20070105 _b1714^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21242 _d21242
041			_aeng