000			01592naa a2200181uu 4500
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003			OSt
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008			070105s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBERNHARD, William _929703
245	1	0	_aA political explanation of variations in Central Bank independence
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cJune 1998
520	3		_aAcross the industrial democracies, central banks perform a similar function: to implement the government's monetary policy by regulating the supply of money and credit to the economy. Nevertheless, the structures of these bureaucratic institutions - their levels of independence - differ across systems. This variation presents a puzzle. On the one hand, independent central banks limit the ability of governments to manipulate monetary policy for their own short-term gain, which implies that governments would never choose an independent central bank. On the other hand, empirical research demonstrates that independent central banks are associated with superior inflation performance, which suggests that all countries would have an independent bank to improve their economies (Alesina 1989; Alesina and Summers 1993; Burdekin and Willett 1991; Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991; Havrilesky and Granato 1993; Neumann 1991).
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g92, 2, p. 311-328 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, June 1998 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070105 _b1521^b _cNatália
998			_a20070105 _b1716^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21249 _d21249
041			_aeng