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008			070105s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aOSTROM, Elinor _98007
245	1	0	_aA behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action : _bpresidential address, American Political Science Association, 1997
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cMarch 1998
520	3		_aThe remainder of this article is divided into six sections. In the first I briefly review the theoretical predictions of currently accepted rational choice theory. related to social dilemmas. The next will summarize the challenge to the sole reliance on a complete model of rationality presented by extensive experimental research. Then I examine two major empirical findings that begin to show how individuals achieve results that are "better than rational" (Cosmides and Tooby 1994) by building conditions in which reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest. The following section raises the possibility of developing second-generation models of rationality, and the next develops an initial theoretical scenario. I conclude by examining the implications of placing reciprocity, reputation, and trust at the core of an empirically tested, behavioral theory of collective action.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g92, 1, p. 1-22 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, March 1998 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070105 _b1624^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21266 _d21266
041			_aeng