000 | 01247naa a2200169uu 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | 7010517433321 | ||
003 | OSt | ||
005 | 20190211162132.0 | ||
008 | 070105s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
100 | 1 |
_aKAUFMAN, Alexander _929735 |
|
245 | 1 | 0 | _aHegel and the ontological critique of liberalism |
260 |
_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cDecember 1997 |
||
520 | 3 | _aIs some form of identification with ethical norms and institutions a necessary condition of viable social life? If so, what form of identification is required? Contemporary communitarian theory argues for a particular form, which I will call strong identification. Because liberalism is unable to ground strong identification, communitarians suggest, it offers a flawed conception of ethical life. I will argue that, while some form of identification may in fact be necessary to ground viable social life, communitarian arguments requiring strong identification are unfaithful to the Hegelian insights which motivate communitarian thought. | |
773 | 0 | 8 |
_tAmerican Political Science Review _g91, 4, p. 807-818 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, December 1997 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w |
942 | _cS | ||
998 |
_a20070105 _b1743^b _cNatália |
||
999 |
_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21285 _d21285 |
||
041 | _aeng |