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001			7010517545421
003			OSt
005			20190211162133.0
008			070105s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aFROHOCK, Fred M _929737
245	1	0	_aThe boundaries of public reason
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cDecember 1997
520	3		_aThe main burden of public reason in the liberal state is to reconcile claims originating in political differences among persons who may have nothing in common except membership in the political system. One of the more prominent exemplars for such reasoning is a supreme court in a constitutional regime with judicial review (Rawls 1993, Lecture VI). It is easy to see why. Deliberation is the preeminent mode of rational dialogue in a legal forum. Claims enter legal domains thick with reasons, justifications, descriptions, and in general with attachments that encourage reflections and judgments within a framework of accepted rules of inference, evidence, and argument. Even though all citizens in a democracy must be prepared to use reason in public matters, judicial forums seem more effective in modeling basic expectations for reasoning in liberal settings. These expectations include the thought that the state can be reasonably independent of partisan or divisive values. Public reasoning in its judicial mode is expected to produce impartial conclusions and to achieve the political reconciliations needed for consensual governing in liberal democracies by relying on values that everyone would reasonably endorse.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g91, 4, p. 833-844 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, December 1997 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070105 _b1754^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21288 _d21288
041			_aeng