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008			070108s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSTERN, Paul _910344
245	1	0	_aThe rule of wisdom and the rule of law in Plato's 'Statesman'
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cJune 1997
520	3		_aRecently, the idea of phronesis has assumed great importance among political theorists. This prominence is due to the perception that, contrary to the application of the methods of naturalscience to polities, phronesis preserves the distinctive character of politics in its refusal to apply inappropriate standards of precision and to find certainty where it does not exist. But precisely because of this, the following question arises: Can we ascertain a nonarbitrary standard of phronesis without denying those characteristics that make it appropriate for the understanding of politics? I address this question by considering the treatment of phronesis (wisdom) found in Plato's Statesman and, in particular, the passage that weighs the relative merits of rule by wisdom and rule by law. In this seminal consideration of phronesis Plato (unlike Aristotle) does not confine his treatment to the practical sphere; even this intensely political passage contains far-reaching rejections on the nature of humanity and the world we inhabit. These explain what we are and what our world is, such that there is a need for this cognitive capacity. As I argue, they express the conditions of phronesis that can provide a guide for its use without negating its essential character.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g91, 2, p. 264-276 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, June 1997 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070108 _b1254^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21315 _d21315
041			_aeng