000			01569naa a2200169uu 4500
001			7010813055121
003			OSt
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008			070108s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aLOWRY, Robert C _929776
245	1	0	_aThe private production of public goods : _borganizational maintenance, managers' objectives, and collective goals
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cJune 1997
520	3		_aI reformulate Mancur Olson's by-product theory of collective action as a theory of resource allocation by interest group managers. I then test alternative hypotheses about managers' objectives drawn from exchange theory and commitment theory. Financial data for 16 environmental citizen groups show that the production of public goods is subsidized by other activities, and revenues from member dues are not affected by spending on public goods. Spending on selective incentives and information generates revenues but also may contribute to the pursuit of collective goals. Estimated marginal revenues from fund-raising and selective incentives show that environmental citizen group managers are not preoccupied with maximizing revenues. Rather, they seek to maximize either spending on public goods or net resources available for influencing public policy and the environment, subject to a budget constraint.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g91, 2, p. 308-323 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, June 1997 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070108 _b1305^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21318 _d21318
041			_aeng