000			01706naa a2200193uu 4500
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003			OSt
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008			070108s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBOX-STEFFENSMEIER, Janet M. _929777
245	1	0	_aThe strategic timing of position taking in Congress : _ba study of the North American Free Trade Agreement
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cJune 1997
520	3		_aA critical element of decision making is the timing of choices political actors make; often when a decision is made is as critical as the decision itself We posit a dynamic model of strategic position announcement based on signaling theories of legislative politics. We suggest that members who receive clear signals from constituents, interest groups, and policy leaders will announce their positions earlier. Those with conflicting signals will seek more information, delaying their announcement. We test several expectations by examining data on when members of the House of Representatives announced their positions on the North American Free Trade Agreement. We also contrast the timing model with a vote model, and find that there are meaningful differences between the factors influencing the timing of position announcements and vote choice. Our research allows analysts to interpret the process leading up to the House action and the end state of that process.
700	1		_aARNOLD, Laura W. _9535
700	1		_aZORN, Christopher J.W _929778
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g91, 2, p. 324-338 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, June 1997 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070108 _b1309^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21319 _d21319
041			_aeng