000			01782naa a2200169uu 4500
001			7010813113821
003			OSt
005			20190211162146.0
008			070108s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aGELPI, Christopher _929779
245	1	0	_aCrime and punishment : _bthe role of norms in crisis bargaining
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cJune 1997
520	3		_aIn this work I test the proposition that normative standards of behavior can influence state actions in security-related conflicts. Specifically, I examine the construction of norms in the settlements of security-related disputes and the effects these settlements have on subsequent militarized interactions. I argue that dispute settlements alter subsequent crisis bargaining in two important ways. First, they act as normative referents that alter the interpretation of subsequent crisis bargaining behavior both by identifying a solution to the dispute which alleviates fears of demands for future concessions and by defining a set of acts which both sides consider illegitimate. Second, in combination with the response to their violation, dispute settlements inflict reputational costs on states that violate them. I test these arguments against a realist theory of crisis bargaining through an analysis of 122 reinitiated international crises between 1929 and 1979. I find strong support for the hypothesis that stases can and do construct normative standards that guide their behavior in international crises, whereas realist theory receives only mixed support.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g91, 2, p. 339-360 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, June 1997 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070108 _b1311^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21320 _d21320
041			_aeng