000			01680naa a2200181uu 4500
001			7010815500121
003			OSt
005			20220608172202.0
008			070108s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMESQUITA, Bruce Bueno de _97148
245	1	0	_aCapabilities, Perception, and Escalation
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cMarch 1997
520	3		_aThe evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty. We model crises as a game of two-sided incomplete information. Players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities. We derive four hypotheses, testing them against crises in Europe between 1815 and 1970. We show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ant observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis, as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We answer five questions: (1) How do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence? (2) How do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence? (3) What do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises? (4) Under what conditions can deterrence succeed? (5) Under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis?
700	1		_919697 _aMorrow, James D.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g91, 1, p. 15-27 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, March 1997 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070108 _b1550^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21341 _d21341
041			_aeng