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100	1		_aSEGAL, Jeffrey A _99752
245	1	0	_aSeparation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cMarch 1997
520	3		_aThe hallmark of the new positive theories of the judiciary is that Supreme Court justices will frequently defer to the preferences of Congress when making decisions, particulary in statutory cases in which it is purportedly easy for Congress to reverse the Court. Alternatively, judicial attitudinalists argue that the institutional structures facing the Court allow the justices to vote their sincere policy preferences. This paper compares these sincere and sophisticated models of voting behavior by Supreme Court justices. Using a variety of tests on the votes of Supreme Court justices in stattutory cases decided between 1947 and 1992, I find some evidence of sophisticated behavior, but most tests suggest otherside. Moreover, direct comparisons between the two models unambiguously favor the attitudinal model. I conclude that the justices overwhelmingly engage in rationally sincere behavior.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g91, 1, p. 28-44 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, March 1997 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070108 _b1605^b _cNatália
998			_a20070110 _b1115^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21343 _d21343
041			_aeng