000 01566naa a2200193uu 4500
001 7011017592821
003 OSt
005 20190211162214.0
008 070110s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100 1 _aCIOFFI, John W.
_929978
245 1 0 _aThe Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism :
_bInterests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform
260 _aThousand Oaks, CA :
_bSAGE Publications,
_cDecember 2006
520 3 _aA striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of organized capitalism, concentrated corporate stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy, and the United States reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves as pro-growth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and appeal to middle-class voters. Conservative parties’ established alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate governance reform
700 1 _aHÖPNER, Martin
_929979
773 0 8 _tPolitics & Society
_g34, 4, p. 463-502
_dThousand Oaks, CA : SAGE Publications, December 2006
_xISSN 0032-3292
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20070110
_b1759^b
_cNatália
998 _a20080326
_b1547^b
_cTiago
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c21475
_d21475
041 _aeng