000			01727naa a2200193uu 4500
001			7011615365410
003			OSt
005			20190211162307.0
008			070116s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aFEARON, James D. _930321
245	1	0	_aExplaining interethnic cooperation
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cDecember 1996
520	3		_aThough both journalists and academic literature on ethnic conflict give the opposite impression, peaceful and even cooperative relations between ethnic groups are far more commom than is large-scale violence. We seek to explain this norm of interethnic peace and how it occasionally breaks down, arguing that formal and informal institutions usually work to contain or "cauterize" disputes between individual members of different groups. Using a social matching game model, we show that local-level interethnic cooperation can be supported in essentially two ways. In spiral equilibria, disputes between individuals are correctly expected, to spiral rapidly beyond the two parties, and fear this induces cooperation "on the equilibrium path". In in-group policing equilibria, individuals ignore transgressions by members of the other group, correctlyexpecting that the culprits will be indentified and sanctioned by their own ethic brethren. A range of examples suggests that both equilibria occur empirically and have properties expected from the theoretical analysis
700	1		_aLAITIN, David D _929525
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g90, 4, p. 715-735 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, December 1996 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070116 _b1536^b _cTiago
998			_a20070116 _b1537^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21818 _d21818
041			_aeng