000			01463naa a2200169uu 4500
001			7011615521110
003			OSt
005			20190211162307.0
008			070116s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aPOWELL, Robert _921361
245	1	0	_aUncertainty, shifting power, and appeasement
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cDecember 1996
650		4	_aGreat Britain faced an immensely complicated strategic problem in the 1930´s, and important aspects of it can be stylized as a situation in wich a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state. If those aims are limited, then the declining state prefers to appease the rising state´s demands rather than go to war to oppose them. If, however, the rising state´s demands are unlimited, the the declining state prefers figthing. And, given that the declining state is becoming weaker over time, it prefers fighting sooner rather than later if there is to be war. This situation creates a trad-off: The earlier a state stands firm, the stronger it will be if war ensues, but the higher the chance of fighting an unnecessary war. In equilibrium, the declining state generally tries to appease te rising state by making a series of concessions _930328
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g90, 4, p. 749-764 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, December 1996 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070116 _b1552^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21825 _d21825
041			_aeng