000			01922naa a2200169uu 4500
001			7031517325023
003			OSt
005			20240703163523.0
008			070315s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_94882 _aHolland, Ian
245	1	0	_aReforming the conventions regarding parliamentary scrutiny of ministerial actions
260			_aOxford : _bBlackwell Published Limited, _cJune 2004
520	3		_aParliamentary scrutiny of government ministers is limited by the convention that one house of parliament cannot compel a member of the other house to appear before it. This convention limits the Senate's capacity to examine ministers who are members of the House of Representatives. It has its origins in UK parliamentary practice, and is given alleged legal force in Australia by virtue of section 49 of Australia's constitution. That section effectively says that Australia's current parliamentary powers, privileges and immunities are those of the UK House of Commons in 1901.However analysis of UK practice prior to the twentieth century reveals a surprising picture. Far from protecting members of one house from the other house's inquiries, it would seem that invitations issued by one chamber to a member of the other were never refused, an element of 'custom and practice' now conveniently overlooked. Furthermore, the purpose of the powers had nothing to do with protecting ministers. On the contrary, their origins He in a desire to ensure the strength of parliamentary accountability. If modern Australian practice is to be true to historical House of Commons practice, consideration should be given to ensuring that each chamber does have guaranteed access to ministers of the other house
773	0	8	_tAustralian Journal of Public Administration _g63, 2, p. 3-15 _dOxford : Blackwell Published Limited, June 2004 _xISSN 0313-6647 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070315 _b1732^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c23161 _d23161
041			_aeng