000			01553naa a2200181uu 4500
001			7052319095910
003			OSt
005			20190211162949.0
008			070523s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWHITFORD, Andrew B _911328
245	1	0	_aThreats, institutions and regulation in common pool resources
260			_aDordrecht, Netherlands : _bSpringer, _cJune 2002
520	3		_aCan bureaucracies respond to threats marked by both potentially high costs and fundamental uncertainty? Standard guidelines such as maximizing expected value to the society over a period of time may be ineffective; yet, state action is often most demanded for such situations. I argue that the precautionary principle of reserved rationality helps explain the ability of bureaucracies to choose appropriate actions under uncertainty. Such bureaucracies are empowered when there is sufficient informal institutional support for their expertise and the bureaucracy has the discretion to take necessary precautions. I draw historical information from the case of Singapore's regulation of the formerly common pool resource of water catchment areas. This case reveals decision making when it is not clear that the expected-value criterion would support action, as well as the importance of political and institutional support for such action
773	0	8	_tPolicy Sciences _g35, 2, p. 125-139 _dDordrecht, Netherlands : Springer, June 2002 _xISSN 0032-2687 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070523 _b1909^b _cTiago
998			_a20070604 _b1436^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c23603 _d23603
041			_aeng