000			02074naa a2200181uu 4500
001			7052319213010
003			OSt
005			20190211162952.0
008			070523s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMILJKOVIC, Dragan _931971
245	1	0	_aEconomic sanctions as the propositional satisfability problem
260			_aDordrecht, Netherlands : _bSpringer, _cMarch 2002
520	3		_aIn this paper we are trying to answer the question of when economic sanctions have the best chance to succeed. Almost three hundred scholars from around the world participated in a survey designed to define which pre-conditions and actions by the sender are desirable in order for economic sanctions to succeed. The resolution algorithm is employed to find out whether there is a consensus among the scholars about the factors leading to the success of economic sanctions. The results provide evidence that when scholars were grouped by region the consensus could be reached that sanctions will succeed if: (1) modest policy change is sought, (2) sanctions are comprehensive, i.e., both trade and financial sanctions are imposed, (3) the target does not receive significant support from a third party, (4) the sender has much greater economy than the target, (5) there is international co-operation in the imposition of sanctions, and (6) the target is economically and politically weak and unstable. When scholars were grouped based on the level of economic development of their countries of origin, a consensus on all but one issue (senders welfare or economic interest are threatened by targets action) was reached between scholars from economically developed nations and scholars from less developed nations. Surprisingly, experts from economically developed nations, i.e., the United States versus EU nations, could not reach a consensus on several issues
773	0	8	_tPolicy Sciences _g35, 1, p. 1-15 _dDordrecht, Netherlands : Springer, March 2002 _xISSN 0032-2687 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070523 _b1921^b _cTiago
998			_a20070604 _b1439^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c23608 _d23608
041			_aeng