000 02103naa a2200205uu 4500
001 7100816271710
003 OSt
005 20190211163205.0
008 071008s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100 1 _aMARVEL, Mary K.
_932868
245 1 0 _aOutsourcing oversight :
_ba comparison of monitoring for in-house and contracted services
260 _aMalden, MA :
_bBlackwell Publishers,
_cMay / June 2007
520 3 _aThe public sector contracting literature has long argued that outsourced services need to be and, in fact, are subject to a more elevated level of scrutiny compared to internally delivered services. Recently, the performance measurement and management literature has suggested that the twin themes of accountability and results have altered the management landscape at all levels of government. By focusing on performance monitoring, the implication is that monitoring levels for internally provided services should more closely approximate those for contracted services. The analysis provided here yields empirical comparisons of how governments monitor the same service provided in-house and contracted out. We find evidence that services provided internally by a government’s own employees are indeed monitored intensively by the contracting government, with levels of monitoring nearly as high as those for services contracted out to for-profit providers. In contrast, however, we find strong evidence that performance monitoring by the contracting government does not extend to nonprofit and other governmental service providers, each of which is monitored much less intensively than when comparable services are provided internally. For such service providers, it appears that monitoring is either outsourced along with services, or simply reduced
590 _aPublic administration review PAR
700 1 _aMARVEL, Howard P
_932869
773 0 8 _tPublic Administration Review: PAR
_g67, 3, p. 521-530
_dMalden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, May / June 2007
_xISSN 00333352
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20071008
_b1627^b
_cTiago
998 _a20090608
_b1714^b
_cmayze
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c24726
_d24726
041 _aeng