000			01602naa a2200205uu 4500
001			7121216455510
003			OSt
005			20190211163329.0
008			071212s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aTHOMSON, Robert _933335
245	1	0	_aThe Paradox of compliance : _binfrigements and delays in transposing european union directives
260			_aCambridge, UK : _bCambridge University Press, _cOctober 2007
520	3		_aWhat impact does the negotiation stage prior to the adoption of international agreements have on the subsequent implementation stage? We address this question by examining the linkages between decision making on European Union directives and any subsequent infringements and delays in national transposition. We formulate a preference-based explanation of failures to comply, which focuses on states' incentives to deviate and the amount of discretion granted to states. This is compared with state-based explanations that focus on country-specific characteristics. Infringements are more likely when states disagree with the content of directives and the directives provide them with little discretion. Granting discretion to member states, however, tends to lead to longer delays in transposition. We find no evidence of country-specific effects
700	1		_aTORENVLIED, René _933336
700	1		_aARREGUI, Javier _933337
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g37, 4, p. 685-709 _dCambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, October 2007 _xISSN 00071234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20071212 _b1645^b _cTiago
998			_a20081031 _b1050^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25304 _d25304
041			_aeng