000			01900naa a2200229uu 4500
001			7121320173119
003			OSt
005			20190212105828.0
008			071213s2001 bl ||||gr |0|| 0 por d
100	1		_aSOLA, Lourder _933354
245	1	0	_aCentral banking reform and overcoming the moral hazard problem : _bthe case of Brasil
260			_aSão Paulo : _bEditora 34, _cjul./set./2001
520	3		_aThe implicit assumption that governments will bailout financial institutuons under distress can generate negative incentives for the development of a sound financial system. This paper begins from the premise that these negative incentives, which create a situation of moral bazard, is essentially a political problem rather than a technical problem over generating correct institutional incentives. In the brazilian case, we argue the current administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso was only able to significantly reduce its moral bazard problem in the financial sector through distancing its political relationship with two important political actors: the private financial state governors. The ability of the government to eliminate the implicit assumption of an eventual Central Bank bailout over public and private commiercial banks was only made possible through a series of political conditions, which includes the end of hvper-inflation under the Real Plan, that reduced the government's dependence upon those two important political actors
590			_aRevista de Economia Política 2001
590			_av. 21, n. 3(83)
700	1		_aGARAMAN, Christopher da Cunha Bueno _933355
700	1		_aMARQUES, Moisés S _933356
773	0	8	_tRevista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy _g21, 3, p. 40-64 _dSão Paulo : Editora 34, jul./set./2001 _xISSN 01013157 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20071213 _b2017^b _cMariana
998			_a20140205 _b1538^b _ckarina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25319 _d25319
041			_apor