000			01556naa a2200205uu 4500
001			7121816350419
003			OSt
005			20190211163341.0
008			071218s2001 bl ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBRUSZT, Laszlo _921586
245	1	0	_aHeterarchies and developmental traps
260			_aSão Paulo : _bEditora 34, _cjan./mar. 2001
520	3		_aState capacity to resist powerful predatory economic groups is highly dependent on the way social diversity is represented within the polity. Such state capacity is weak when a single branch of government can usurp the representation of public good between two elections. In some democracies that I call heterarchies, coalition partners, parties in different houses of the legislature, different levels and branches of government, autonomous state agencies compel executives to take into account diverse modes of representation while making their programs and policies. Such constraints on executive authority allow the state to rise above the direct distribution of powers and interests within the economy. In the paper I use the Russian case to analyze the relationship between state weakness and the related problems of economic development
590			_aRevista de Economia Política 2001
590			_av. 21, n. 1(81)
773	0	8	_tRevista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy _g21, 1 , p. 3-20 _dSão Paulo : Editora 34, jan./mar. 2001 _xISSN 01013157 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20071218 _b1635^b _cMariana
998			_a20140206 _b1142^b _ckarina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25366 _d25366
041			_aeng