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100 1 _aBRITTO, Paulo Augusto P. de
_933438
245 1 0 _aEstrutura de propriedade e eficiência :
_buma análise com teoria dos incentivos
260 _aSão Paulo :
_bEditora 34,
_cjul./set. 1999
520 3 _aThis article discusses the influence of the ownership structure over the efficiency. The framework used is the incentive theory, in which the principal must build an incentive scheme, which induces an agent to act optimally. First, we verify the reasons for public intervention in industries with market failure. Following, we study the deterioration of the incentive structure over managers as a result of the ownership change. So, we verify how the structure of incentives can be restored with the firm’s privatization, with the maintenance, by the government, of some control over the firm. Finally, we make a brief exposition about the regulatory instruments
590 _aRevista de Economía Política 1999
590 _av. 19, n. 3(75)
773 0 8 _tRevista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy
_g19, 3, p. 57-66
_dSão Paulo : Editora 34, jul./set. 1999
_xISSN 01013157
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20080111
_b1113^b
_cMariana
998 _a20140207
_b1112^b
_ckarina
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c25435
_d25435
041 _apor