000			01528naa a2200205uu 4500
001			8011511071119
003			OSt
005			20191029114837.0
008			080115s1999 bl ||||gr |0|| 0 por d
100	1		_930537 _aMendes, Marcos
245	1	0	_aAspectos institucionais da performance fiscal de estados e municípios
260			_aSão Paulo : _bEditora 34, _cjan./mar. 1999
520	3		_aThis paper shows that the rules established to control state and municipal debt in Brazil are inefficient. They can not prevent the excessive growth of the debt nor to avoid the approval of loans that have a negative benefit-cost relation. The paper uses theoretical models proposed by Shepsle and Weingast (1981) and Niou and Ordershook (1985), related to pork barrel projects, to show that The Federal Senate, responsible for the debt control, does not have enough incentives to restrict the debt. The strategy chosen by the majority of senators, trying to maximize the probability of being reelected, results in the approval of all applications made by states and municipalities that want to raise loans. The paper proposes changes in the control rules, to make them efficient
590			_aRevista de Economia Política 1999
590			_av. 19, n. 1(73)
773	0	8	_tRevista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy _g19, 1, p. 145-158 _dSão Paulo : Editora 34, jan./mar. 1999 _xISSN 01013157 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080115 _b1107^b _cMariana
998			_a20140210 _b0932^b _ckarina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25456 _d25456
041			_apor