000 | 01453naa a2200205uu 4500 | ||
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001 | 8013010491419 | ||
003 | OSt | ||
005 | 20190212110232.0 | ||
008 | 080130s1995 bl ||||gr |0|| 0 por d | ||
100 | 1 |
_aHANEKE, Uwe _933610 |
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245 | 1 | 0 | _aA inflação brasileira e a teoria de jogos |
260 |
_aSão Paulo : _bNobel, _cout./dez. 1995 |
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520 | 3 | _aBased on the disaggregation of the private sector as an amplification of the well-known Barro & Gordon policy-game model, a coordination and/or cooperation problem of the price-setters in the private sector is identified as a possible cause for the persistence of inflation even during stabilization efforts. This kind of persistence is, at least in the short-term, independent from the willingness of the government to stop inflation. A process of self-fulfilling prophecies is started by the wait-and-see behavior of private sectors price-setters, which can result in the giving up of the stabilization policy. Breaking this wait-and-see behavior could be one of the major problems in stabilizing economies with chronic high inflation | |
590 | _aRevista de Economia Política 1995 | ||
590 | _av. 15, n. 4(60) | ||
773 | 0 | 8 |
_tRevista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy _g15, 4, p. 84-98 _dSão Paulo : Nobel, out./dez. 1995 _xISSN 01013157 _w |
942 | _cS | ||
998 |
_a20080130 _b1049^b _cMariana |
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998 |
_a20140217 _b0930^b _ckarina |
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999 |
_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25624 _d25624 |
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041 | _apor |