000 01453naa a2200205uu 4500
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003 OSt
005 20190212110232.0
008 080130s1995 bl ||||gr |0|| 0 por d
100 1 _aHANEKE, Uwe
_933610
245 1 0 _aA inflação brasileira e a teoria de jogos
260 _aSão Paulo :
_bNobel,
_cout./dez. 1995
520 3 _aBased on the disaggregation of the private sector as an amplification of the well-known Barro & Gordon policy-game model, a coordination and/or cooperation problem of the price-setters in the private sector is identified as a possible cause for the persistence of inflation even during stabilization efforts. This kind of persistence is, at least in the short-term, independent from the willingness of the government to stop inflation. A process of self-fulfilling prophecies is started by the “wait-and-see” behavior of private sector’s price-setters, which can result in the giving up of the stabilization policy. Breaking this “wait-and-see” behavior could be one of the major problems in stabilizing economies with chronic high inflation
590 _aRevista de Economia Política 1995
590 _av. 15, n. 4(60)
773 0 8 _tRevista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy
_g15, 4, p. 84-98
_dSão Paulo : Nobel, out./dez. 1995
_xISSN 01013157
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20080130
_b1049^b
_cMariana
998 _a20140217
_b0930^b
_ckarina
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c25624
_d25624
041 _apor