000			01414naa a2200205uu 4500
001			8013013355319
003			OSt
005			20190212110237.0
008			080130s1995 bl ||||gr |0|| 0 por d
100	1		_aCARVALHO, Fernando J. Cardim de _926860
245	1	0	_aA independência do banco Central e a disciplina monetária : _bobservações céticas
260			_aSão Paulo : _bNobel, _cout./dez. 1995
520	3		_aOrthodox conventional wisdom related to monetary policy in the 1990s presents the independence of central banks as a condition for achieving durable price stability, as it did with respect to the adoption of fixed rules for monetary growth in the 1980s. The paper proceeds to a critical examination of the arguments, in which it is concluded that, besides the undesirable political implications of the proposal, the thesis is too dependent on specious and fragile concepts as the natural rate of unemployment and the allegedly inherent inflationary bias of monetary authorities as well as on a very narrow view of the role of monetary authorities
590			_aRevista de Economia Política 1995
590			_av. 15, n. 4(60)
773	0	8	_tRevista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy _g15, 4, p. 134 _dSão Paulo : Nobel, out./dez. 1995 _xISSN 01013157 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080130 _b1335^b _cMariana
998			_a20140217 _b0950^b _ckarina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25627 _d25627
041			_apor