000			01662naa a2200181uu 4500
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003			OSt
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008			080131s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSORENSEN, Rune J _933619
245	1	0	_aDoes dispersed public ownership impair effciency? : _bthe case of refuse collection in Norway
260			_aMalden, MA : _bBlackwell Publishers, _cDecember 2007
520	3		_aCorporate governance theory suggests that companies with dispersed and indirect ownership suffer from agency costs. A worst case is where several political authorities jointly own a company, which allows managers to operate with inferior efficiency. In political economy, the manager is not the major agency problem. Elected politicians may impair efficiency to improve their re-election prospects. Since politicians have less influence in jointly owned firms, such companies are expected to perform better than those owned by a single public authority.
520	3		_aConsistent with corporate governance – but not political economy – the empirical analysis suggests that dispersed municipal ownership impairs cost efficiency. In the Norwegian case of municipal refuse collection presented here, costs of dispersed ownership often outstrip gains from economies of scale. Use of jointly owned companies is not necessarily a proper response to efficiency problems inherent a fragmented local government structure
773	0	8	_tPublic Administration : an international quarterly _g85, 4, p. 1045-1058 _dMalden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, December 2007 _xISSN 00333298 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080131 _b1448^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25637 _d25637
041			_aeng