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_aPAIVA, Claudio A. C. _933663 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | _aInteresses eleitorais e flutuações de preços em mercados regulados |
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_aSão Paulo : _bNobel, _cout./dez. 1994 |
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| 520 | 3 | _aThis paper builds on the theory of regulation developed by Stigler and Peltzman. According to these authors, a regulator chooses his/her strategy seeking to maximize political support from consumers and producers, viewing welfare and efficiency as secondary issues. This process determines a regulated price that is between the competitive and monopolistic levels. Our paper develops a modified version of Peltzmans model by considering the idea that the regulators behavior might change with the proximity of elections. The addition of a timing dimension to the problem and its implication for consumers, producers and the regulators behavior suggest that the optimal strategy now implies in a price cycle in regulated industries. The regulator has incentives to impose higher prices when elections are relatively far ahead and lower (real) prices in periods that immediately precede an important election. We show that the Brazilian gasoline market between 1969-1984 supports our results | |
| 590 | _aRevista de Economia Política 1994 | ||
| 590 | _av. 14, n. 4(56) | ||
| 773 | 0 | 8 |
_tRevista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy _g14, 4, p. 31-40 _dSão Paulo : Nobel, out./dez. 1994 _xISSN 01013157 _w |
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_a20080219 _b1138^b _cMariana |
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_a20140217 _b1439^b _ckarina |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25690 _d25690 |
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