000			01837naa a2200181uu 4500
001			8030718345710
003			OSt
005			20190211163456.0
008			080307s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aHEINMILLER, B. Timothy _922375
245	1	0	_aDo intergovenmental institutions matter? : _bthe case of water diversion regulation in the Great Lakes Basin
260			_aOxford, UK : _bBlackwell Publishers, _cOctober 2007
520	3		_aThis article explores the role of intergovernmental institutions in domestic policy formation by investigating the extent to which these institutions substantively influence domestic policy choices. It does so by utilizing a rational choice institutionalist approach that focuses on the constraints and incentives created by intergovernmental rules and how these constraints and incentives do or do not influence eventual government policy decisions. The veto player concept is used to highlight some of the most important constraints and incentives, as well as to differentiate among various types of intergovernmental institutions. The cases examined involve water diversion regulation in the Great Lakes Basin and the three distinct intergovernmental institutions that have been created in this area: the International Boundary Waters Treaty, the Great Lakes Charter, and the Water Resources Development Act. The evidence suggests that intergovernmental institutions can matter in the development of domestic policy, but only those that include veto players as part of their institutional design
773	0	8	_tGovernance : an international journal of policy, administration, and institutions _g20, 4, p. 655-674 _dOxford, UK : Blackwell Publishers, October 2007 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080307 _b1834^b _cTiago
998			_a20100414 _b1539^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25858 _d25858
041			_aeng