000			01686naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8030718540310
003			OSt
005			20190211163500.0
008			080307s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aCHEN, Jowei _933789
245	1	0	_aThe Law of k/n : _bthe effect of chamber size on government spending in bicameral legislatures
260			_aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _cNovember 2007
520	3		_aRecent work in political economics has examined the positive relationship between legislative size and spending, which Weingast et al. (1981) formalized as the law of 1/n. However, empirical tests of this theory have produced a pattern of divergent findings. The positive relationship between seats and spending appears to hold consistently for unicameral legislatures and for upper chambers in bicameral legislatures but not for lower chambers. We bridge this gap between theory and empirics by extending Weingast et al.'s model to account for bicameralism in the context of a Baron–Ferejohn bargaining game. Our comparative statics predict, and empirical data from U.S. state legislatures corroborate, that the size of the upper chamber (n) is a positive predictor of expenditure, whereas the ratio of lower-to-upper chamber seats (k) exhibits a negative effect. We refer to these relationships as the law of k/n, as the two variables influence spending in opposite directions
700	1		_aMALHOTRA, Neil _933790
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g101, 4, p. 657-676 _dNew York : Cambridge University Press, November 2007 _xISSN 00030554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080307 _b1854^b _cTiago
998			_a20081113 _b1013^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25862 _d25862
041			_aeng