000			01713naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8030718561910
003			OSt
005			20190211163500.0
008			080307s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aCHAPMAN, Thomas _933791
245	1	0	_aPartition as a solution to wars of nationalism : _bthe importance of institutions
260			_aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _cNovember 2007
520	3		_aCivil war settlements create institutional arrangements that in turn shape postsettlement politics among the parties to the previous conflict. Following civil wars that involve competing nation-state projects, partition is more likely than alternative institutional arrangements—specifically, unitarism, de facto separation, and autonomy arrangements—to preserve the peace and facilitate democratization. A theory of domestic political institutions as a constraint on reescalation of conflict explains this unexpected relationship through four intermediate effects—specifically, the likelihood that each institutional arrangement will reinforce incompatible national identities, focus the pursuit of greed and grievance on a single zero-sum conflict over the allocation of decision rights, empower the parties to the previous conflict with multiple escalatory options, and foster incompatible expectations of victory. The theory's predictions stand up under statistical tests that use four alternative datasets
700	1		_aROEDER, Philip G _933792
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g101, 4, p. 677-691 _dNew York : Cambridge University Press, November 2007 _xISSN 00030554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080307 _b1856^b _cTiago
998			_a20081113 _b1013^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25863 _d25863
041			_aeng