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100 1 _aHABYARIMANA, James
_933794
245 1 0 _aWhy does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision?
260 _aNew York :
_bCambridge University Press,
_cNovember 2007
520 3 _aA large and growing literature links high levels of ethnic diversity to low levels of public goods provision. Yet although the empirical connection between ethnic heterogeneity and the underprovision of public goods is widely accepted, there is little consensus on the specific mechanisms through which this relationship operates. We identify three families of mechanisms that link diversity to public goods provision—what we term “preferences,” “technology,” and “strategy selection” mechanisms—and run a series of experimental games that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mechanisms within each of these three families. Results from games conducted with a random sample of 300 subjects from a slum neighborhood of Kampala, Uganda, suggest that successful public goods provision in homogenous ethnic communities can be attributed to a strategy selection mechanism: in similar settings, co-ethnics play cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do not. In addition, we find evidence for a technology mechanism: co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus plausibly better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction. We find no evidence for prominent preference mechanisms that emphasize the commonality of tastes within ethnic groups or a greater degree of altruism toward co-ethnics, and only weak evidence for technology mechanisms that focus on the impact of shared ethnicity on the productivity of teams
700 1 _aHUNPHREYS, Macartan
_933795
700 1 _aPOSNER, Daniel N.
_929436
700 1 _aWEINSTEIN, Jeremy M
_911254
773 0 8 _tAmerican Political Science Review
_g101, 4, p. 709-725
_dNew York : Cambridge University Press, November 2007
_xISSN 00030554
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20080307
_b1901^b
_cTiago
998 _a20081113
_b1013^b
_cZailton
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c25865
_d25865
041 _aeng