000			01701naa a2200181uu 4500
001			8030719024810
003			OSt
005			20190211163502.0
008			080307s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMARKS, Jonathan _933796
245	1	0	_aRousseau's discriminating defense of compassion
260			_aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _cNovember 2007
520	3		_aPolitical theorists from Martha Nussbaum to Amitai Etzioni appeal to compassion as a basis that liberalism otherwise lacks for refraining from exploiting and even for helping others. However, critics like Clifford Orwin and Richard Boyd have raised this question: is compassion too weak and undiscriminating to rely on in politics? Jean-Jacques Rousseau's account of compassion helps answer it. Rousseau understands compassion as a useful manifestation of the otherwise dangerous desire to extend the self and show signs of power. Consequently, he considers compassion's relative weakness a strength and explains how it can be supplemented and complemented by other, independent motives for serving others, including gratitude, friendship, and obligation. Compassion's weakness also makes it less likely than self-love, narrowly conceived, to overwhelm reason. Rousseau excels compassion's contemporary defenders in his awareness of the complex relationship between compassion and other social passions and of the dangers that his understanding of compassion addresses
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g101, 4, p. 727-739 _dNew York : Cambridge University Press, November 2007 _xISSN 00030554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080307 _b1902^b _cTiago
998			_a20081113 _b1014^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25866 _d25866
041			_aeng