000			01824naa a2200181uu 4500
001			8030719104410
003			OSt
005			20190211163504.0
008			080307s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aPOWELL, Robert _921361
245	1	0	_aAllocating defensive resources with private information about vulnerability
260			_aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _cNovember 2007
520	3		_aIn many resources-allocation problems, strategic adversaries move sequentially and are likely to have private information about the effectiveness of their spending. A defender, for example, often has to allocate its defensive resources before an attacker (e.g., a terrorist group) decides where to strike. Defenders are also likely to have private information about the vulnerability of the things they are trying to protect. Sequential decisions and private information about effectiveness creates a dilemma for a defender. Allocating more to a highly vulnerable site reduces the expected losses should that site be attacked but may also signal that that site is more vulnerable and thereby increase the probability of an attack. Modeling this tradeoff as a signaling game, the analysis shows that secrecy concerns generally swamp vulnerability concerns when more vulnerable sites are weakly harder to protect on the margin. The defender pools in equilibrium, that is, allocates its resources in the same way, regardless of the level of vulnerability. If more vulnerable sites are easier to protect on the margin, vulnerability concerns may swamp secrecy concerns
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g101, 4, p. 799-809 _dNew York : Cambridge University Press, November 2007 _xISSN 00030554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080307 _b1910^b _cTiago
998			_a20081113 _b1015^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25870 _d25870
041			_aeng