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| 001 | 8030719124810 | ||
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| 005 | 20190211163505.0 | ||
| 008 | 080307s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aANDERSON IV, Robert _933800 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | _aInstitutions and equilibrium in the United States Supreme Court |
| 260 |
_aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _cNovember 2007 |
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| 520 | 3 | _aOver the last decade the scholarship on judicial politics has increasingly emphasized the strategic aspects of decision making in the United States Supreme Court. This scholarship, however, has struggled with two significant limitationsthe restriction to unidimensional policy spaces and the assumption of binary comparisons of alternatives. These two assumptions have the advantage of implying stable, predictable outcomes, but lack a sound theoretical foundation and assume away potentially important aspects of strategic behavior on the Court. In this article, we identify institutional features of the Court that, under certain conditions, allow us to relax these two assumptions without sacrificing stable, predictable policy outcomes. In particular, we formalize the part-by-part opinion voting used by the justices, a feature that, together with separable preferences over policy issues, implies stable policy outcomes around the issue-by-issue median of the justices | |
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_aTAHK, Alexander M _933801 |
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| 773 | 0 | 8 |
_tAmerican Political Science Review _g101, 4, p. 811-825 _dNew York : Cambridge University Press, November 2007 _xISSN 00030554 _w |
| 942 | _cS | ||
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_a20080307 _b1912^b _cTiago |
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_a20081113 _b1015^b _cZailton |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c25871 _d25871 |
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| 041 | _aeng | ||