000			01996naa a2200181uu 4500
001			8041715241424
003			OSt
005			20190211163603.0
008			080417s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aPRINS, Brandon C _934069
245	1	0	_aCommitted To Peace : _bLiberal Institutions and the Termination of Rivalry
260			_aCambridge, UK : _bCambridge University Press, _cJanuary 2008
520	3		_aRivalry is characterized by mutual mistrust, anger and fear, and becomes increasingly intractable as confrontations between rivals militarize. The empirical record confirms that rivalries account for the vast number of militarized interstate disputes and wars in the international system. Although considerable attention has been spent on the initiation, duration or termination of rivalries, to date no comprehensive theoretical framework for their persistence or failure exists. Following Fearon, a rationalist explanation of rivalry termination is developed. It is argued here that the adoption of liberal institutions helps alleviate the commitment problems arising in rivalry. Free-market reform, democratic institutions and membership in international organizations all build trust and increase defection costs among rival states, and therefore help to shorten the duration of rivalry. Using a Cox proportional hazard model and Thompson's data on rivalries, it is shown that change towards democracy, as well as the joint effect of democracy and economic development increase the likelihood of rivalry termination. Also, joint membership in international organizations with mechanisms for dispute settlement reduces the duration of rivalry.Arobustness check using Diehl and Goertz's list of rivalries produces similar results
700	1		_aDAXECKER, Ursula E _934070
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science, _g38, 1, p. 17-44 _dCambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, January 2008 _xISSN 0007-1234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080417 _b1524^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c26208 _d26208
041			_aeng