000			01746naa a2200181uu 4500
001			8041715272124
003			OSt
005			20190211163604.0
008			080417s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMALHOTRA, Neil _933790
245	1	0	_aPolitical Stability Under Uncertainty : _bApplying Bounded Rationality to the Study of Governance and Civil Conflict
260			_aCambridge, UK : _bCambridge University Press, _cJanuary 2008
520	3		_aAcentral puzzle in the comparative politics literature has been why certain societies are able to achieve political stability while others suffer from strife, repression and authoritarian rule. This article applies the solution concept of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to Weingast's Sovereign-Constituency Co-ordination Game in order to show how our understanding of political stability can be enhanced when uncertainty and limited rationality are explicitly modelled. Comparative statics results first confirm the intuitive logic that civil conflict is unlikely when regimes threaten penalties for revolt that are much more severe than current living conditions and when the benefits to a successful revolt are not sufficiently enticing. In addition, our analysis provides a logic for the outbreak of civil conflict, noting that it is most likely when key payoffs are in their intermediate regions and far from critical ‘thresholds’, resulting in ambiguous and counterintuitive decision making by leaders and citizen opposition groups
700	1		_aCARNES, Matthew E _934071
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science, _g38, 1, p. 45-64 _dCambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, January 2008 _xISSN 1750-8762 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080417 _b1527^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c26209 _d26209
041			_aeng