000			01793naa a2200181uu 4500
001			8041715304524
003			OSt
005			20190211163604.0
008			080417s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aHELLWING, Timothy _934072
245	1	0	_aElectoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes
260			_aCambridge, UK : _bCambridge University Press, _cJanuary 2008
520	3		_aDo voters reward or punish incumbents for retrospective performance similarly in different democratic regimes? Despite debates on the merits of different regimes, little research has investigated the implications of constitutional design on voters' ability to hold politicians to account. This article shows that regime type determines the way and extent to which elections enable voters to reward or sanction incumbents. These regime effects are separate from and conceptually prior to factors previously identified in the literature on comparative economic voting. Analysis of elections from seventy-five countries reveals that, all else equal, voters have greater potential to hold incumbents to accounts under the separation of powers than under parliamentarism. Moreover, variables particular to separation of powers systems – the electoral cycle in pure presidential systems and instances of cohabitation in semi-presidential systems – affect the relative impact of the attribution of responsibility. The results contribute to ongoing debates about the relative advantages of different constitutional formats for democratic performance
700	1		_aSAMUELS, David _99419
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g38, 1, p. 65-90 _dCambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, January 2008 _xISSN 1750-8762 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080417 _b1530^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c26210 _d26210
041			_aeng