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001 8041715422024
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008 080417s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100 1 _aGERRING, John
_921367
245 1 0 _aThe Mechanismic Worldview :
_bThinking Inside the Box
260 _aCambridge, UK :
_bCambridge University Press,
_cJanuary 2008
520 3 _aA widespread turn towards mechanism-centred explanations can be viewed across the social sciences in recent decades. This article clarifies what it might mean in practical terms to adopt a mechanismic view of causation. This simple task of definition turns out to be considerably more difficult than it might at first appear. The body of the article elucidates a series of tensions and conflicts within this ambient concept, looking closely at how influential authors have employed this ubiquitous term. It is discovered that ‘mechanism’ has at least nine distinct meanings as the term is used within contemporary social science: (1) the pathway or process by which an effect is produced; (2) an unobservable causal factor; (3) an easy-to-observe causal factor; (4) a context-dependent (bounded) explanation; (5) a universal (or at least highly general) explanation; (6) an explanation that presumes highly contingent phenomena; (7) an explanation built on phenomena that exhibit lawlike regularities; (8) a distinct technique of analysis (based on qualitative, case study, or process-tracing evidence); or (9) a micro-level explanation for a causal phenomenon. Some of these meanings may be combined into coherent definitions; others are obviously contradictory. It is argued, however, that only the first meaning is consistent with all contemporary usages and with contemporary practices within the social sciences; this is therefore proposed as a minimal (core) definition of the concept. The other meanings are regarded as arguments surrounding the core concept
773 0 8 _tBritish Journal of Political Science
_g38, 1, p. 161-180
_dCambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, January 2008
_xISSN 0007-1234
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20080417
_b1542^b
_cZailton
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c26214
_d26214
041 _aeng