000			01507naa a2200169uu 4500
001			8041809401024
003			OSt
005			20190211163608.0
008			080418s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aJACOBS, Alan M _934081
245	1	0	_aThe Politics of When : _bRedistribution, Investment and Policy Making for the Long Term
260			_aCambridge, UK: : _bCambridge University Press, _cApril 2008
520	3		_aWhy do some elected governments impose short-term costs to invest in solving long-term social problems while others delay or merely redistribute the pain? This article addresses that question by examining the politics of pension reform in Britain and the United States. It first reframes the conventional view of the outcomes – centred on cross-sectional distribution – demonstrating that the politicians who enacted the least radical redistribution enacted the most dramatic intertemporal tradeoffs. To explain this pattern, the article develops and tests a theory of policy choice in which organized interests struggle for long-term advantage under institutional constraints. The argument points to major analytical advantages to studying governments' policy choices in intertemporal terms, for both the identification of comparative puzzles and their explanation
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g38, 2, p. 193-220 _dCambridge, UK: : Cambridge University Press, April 2008 _xISSN 0007-1234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080418 _b0940^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c26219 _d26219
041			_aeng