000			01957naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8052316301710
003			OSt
005			20190211163634.0
008			080523s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aJAMES, Oliver _95142
245	1	0	_aPublic management at the ballot box : _bperformance information and electoral support for incumbent english local governments
260			_aNew York : _bOxford University, _coct. 2007
520	3		_aPublishing performance information about local public services, an increasing trend in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, matters politically because it has an effect on incumbent local governments' electoral support. Voters are able to use performance information to punish or reward incumbents in the elections that follow their publication, which may fill a gap in the chain of accountability between voters and governments. We model the introduction of published Comprehensive Performance Assessments of local authorities in England, which make summary information about performance available to voters, as a "shock" to the relationship between voters and incumbents. Controlling for an unpublicized measure of performance change over time, change in the local tax level, change in local economic conditions, and whether the local incumbent is the party of the incumbent government at the national level, we find negativity bias. Incumbents in local authorities in the "poor" performance category experience a substantial reduction in aggregate vote share at the election following publication, but there is no similarly sized reward for those in the highest performance category
700	1		_aJOHN, Peter _917964
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g17, 4, p. 567-580 _dNew York : Oxford University, oct. 2007 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080523 _b1630^b _cTiago
998			_a20120521 _b1036^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c26449 _d26449
041			_aeng