000			01835naa a2200205uu 4500
001			8052316343410
003			OSt
005			20190211163635.0
008			080523s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aLINDQUIST, Stefanie A _928442
245	1	0	_aSupreme Court auditing of the US courts of appeals : _ban organizational perspective
260			_aNew York : _bOxford University, _coct. 2007
520	3		_aUsing an aggregate-level model of Supreme Court–circuit court interactions, this study assesses the extent to which the Court's auditing process of circuit court outputs is shaped by organizational dynamics such as structural capacity, institutionalization, and demographic characteristics. Principals in organizational hierarchies must audit the behavior of their agents to ensure that the agents are faithfully complying with the principals' preferences. In the case of the Supreme Court, such auditing activities must take place in the face of very limited institutional capacity on the Court's part. We propose that the Court considers certain broad organizational and institutional characteristics at the circuit level when performing this task. In particular, we find that the Court strategically allocates its limited institutional resources to audit decisions to respond to its recent interactions with individual circuits in past terms, the circuits' internal decision-making dynamics (including dissent and reversal rates), and goal conflict between the circuit and the Supreme Court
700	1		_aHAIRE, Susan B _934250
700	1		_aSONGER, Donald R _934251
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g17, 4, p. 607-624 _dNew York : Oxford University, oct. 2007 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080523 _b1634^b _cTiago
998			_a20120521 _b1036^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c26451 _d26451
041			_aeng