000			01702naa a2200181uu 4500
001			8060218514910
003			OSt
005			20190211163656.0
008			080602s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKIM, Doo-Rae _934317
245	1	0	_aPolitical control and bureaucratic autonomy revisited : _ba multi-institutional analysis of OSHA enforcement
260			_aNew York : _bOxford University, _cjan. 2008
520	3		_aThe proper role of bureaucracy in democratic governance has long been a matter of controversy. One part of the debate involves the argument that democratic control and bureaucratic autonomy are dichotomous opposites: if there is democratic control, there cannot be bureaucratic autonomy, and vice versa. This article develops a spatial model of bureaucratic policy choices that reveals that conditions of democratic control and bureaucratic autonomy are not incompatible: the interactions among political institutions not only create the condition in which government agencies must respond to the will of the elected officials but also provide the opportunity for the agencies to reflect their own preferences in policy outcomes. Empirical analyses of occupational safety and health enforcement between 1982 and 2000 provide support for the general argument that bureaucratic responsiveness and bureaucratic autonomy together constitute the behavioral characteristics of bureaucracy under institutional influence
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g18, 1, p. 33-55 _dNew York : Oxford University, jan. 2008 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080602 _b1851^b _cTiago
998			_a20120521 _b1031^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c26528 _d26528
041			_aeng