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| 001 | 8061619090810 | ||
| 003 | OSt | ||
| 005 | 20190211163728.0 | ||
| 008 | 080616s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aBERTELLI, Anthony _934622 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | _aStrategic appointments |
| 260 |
_aLondon, UK : _bOxford University, _cjan. 2007 |
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| 520 | 3 | _aThis article develops an institutional spatial theory of presidential appointments to administrative agencies that falls within the spirit of a recent line of theoretical research toward an institutional theory of the presidency. We show that when bureaucrats implement policy that results from negotiation with constituents, the ally principle—appointing political allies—holds only as a knife-edge condition. Presidents are better served by appointing administrators whose preferences partially offset the influence of organized interests. The incentives described have implications for the selection of a whole range of bureaucratic personnel at various levels, generating significant implications for the study of public management on issues such as personnel administration, representative bureaucracy, and the devolution of administrative authority | |
| 700 | 1 |
_aFELDMANN, Sven E _934623 |
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| 773 | 0 | 8 |
_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g17, 1, p. 19-38 _dLondon, UK : Oxford University, jan. 2007 _xISSN 10531858 _w |
| 942 | _cS | ||
| 998 |
_a20080616 _b1909^b _cTiago |
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| 998 |
_a20120521 _b1048^b _cCarolina |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c26732 _d26732 |
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| 041 | _aeng | ||