000			01565naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8061619290410
003			OSt
005			20231017132031.0
008			080616s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aDIAS, Janice Johnson _934629
245	1	0	_aFor-Profit welfare : _bcontracts, conflicts, and the performance paradox
260			_aLondon, UK : _bOxford University, _capr. 2007
520	3		_aThis article examines how financial inducements in performance contracts shape the inner workings of a for-profit welfare-to-work training program serving long-term recipients. Our work pays particular attention to how contract requirements shape relationships between manager and line staff and their treatment of clients. We argue that contract design, coupled with bottom-level management efforts to meet contractual obligations, leads to a performance paradox—the same actions taken to achieve contractual results ironically produce negative program practice and poor client outcomes. Thus, rigidly constructed legal agreements between the government and private service providers can distort incentive structures, causing programmatic conflicts between management and staff, and do little to reduce long-term welfare use and diminish recipients' poverty
700	1		_96871 _aMaynard-Moody, Steven
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g17, 2, p. 189-211 _dLondon, UK : Oxford University, apr. 2007 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080616 _b1929^b _cTiago
998			_a20120521 _b1045^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c26739 _d26739
041			_aeng