000			01700naa a2200181uu 4500
001			8061619513710
003			OSt
005			20240229133950.0
008			080616s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_91089 _aBertelli, Anthony M
245	1	0	_aDeterminants of bureaucratic turnover intention : _bevidence from the department of the trasury
260			_aLondon, UK : _bOxford University, _capr. 2007
520	3		_aThis study employs a novel statistical strategy to examine the determinants of turnover intention in government service. To appropriately measure a main determinant of turnover intention—functional preferences—I estimate an ordinal item response model using data from the Federal Human Capital Survey. The sample is selected to facilitate an important comparison: the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has undergone significant performance-based pay reforms for supervisors, but not for nonsupervisors, whereas the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), also a subunit of the U.S. Treasury, has not. Inferential models of turnover intention reveal among other things that functional and friendship solidary preferences are important determinants of turnover intention, but increased accountability is associated with greater turnover among subordinates. IRS supervisors, who face paybanding, are significantly less likely to consider leaving than their counterparts in the OCC, who do not face such incentives
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory _g17, 2, p. 235-258 _dLondon, UK : Oxford University, apr. 2007 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080616 _b1951^b _cTiago
998			_a20120521 _b1045^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c26741 _d26741
041			_aeng