000			02070naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8070820022510
003			OSt
005			20190211163915.0
008			080708s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKÖNIG, Thomas _934859
245	1	0	_aWhy do member states empower the european parliament?
260			_aPhiladelphia, PA : _bRoutledge, _cMarch 2008
520	3		_aThis is the first study which provides a strategic view on the empowering of the EP by the member states. Compared to the consultation procedure, in which the Council adopts Commission proposals, the EP has become a co-legislator in the codecision procedure, in which it usually promotes an integrationist position favouring policy change. According to this supranational scenario, most scholars conclude that member states intend to increase the legitimacy of the EU rather than their benefits from legislative outcomes. For some authors the empowering of the EP is even a significant example of the limits and deficits of rational choice theory.
520	3		_aFrom a strategic perspective, however, this study clarifies that member states can benefit from introducing the codecision procedure in the supranational scenario. When the parliament can hardly figure out the complex configuration in the Council, member states can strategically misrepresent their pivotal member's 'true' position and present a minority proposal in the conciliation bargains that is more closely located to the status quo. Under these conditions, the introduction of the codecision procedure has several advantages for the member states; in particular it improves the benefits of member states vis--vis solutions under the consultation procedure, in which a better informed Commission makes a proposal that must find the support only of a qualified majority of member states
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g15, 2, p. 167-188 _dPhiladelphia, PA : Routledge, March 2008 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080708 _b2002^b _cTiago
998			_a20081029 _b1111^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c26927 _d26927
041			_aeng