000			01701naa a2200205uu 4500
001			8070820161210
003			OSt
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008			080708s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMAURER, Andreas _934862
245	1	0	_aExplaining group membership in the european parliament : _bthe british conservatives and the movement for european reform
260			_aPhiladelphia, PA : _bRoutledge, _cMarch 2008
520	3		_aThis article examines the decisions behind group membership in the European Parliament (EP) using a rational-choice institutionalist framework. Following the goals ascribed to them by Strm (1990) in other settings, national parties should join the largest group that matches their socioeconomic preferences. Yet, whilst explanations taking national parties as the basic unit of analysis might sometimes suffice, we argue that it is often necessary to consider the influence of individual parliamentarians and existing EP groups. The scope open to these various actors to pursue their interests determines the attractiveness of the various options available to a national party. We illustrate our conceptual framework by reference to the attempt by the British Conservative Party to leave the European People's Party-European Democrats (EPP-ED) group, an effort ending in the formation of an extra-parliamentary federation, the Movement for European Reform
700	1		_aPARKES, Roderick _934863
700	1		_aWAGNER, Markus _934864
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g15, 2, p. 246-262 _dPhiladelphia, PA : Routledge, March 2008 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080708 _b2016^b _cTiago
998			_a20081029 _b1112^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c26931 _d26931
041			_aeng