000			01581naa a2200205uu 4500
001			8073114311110
003			OSt
005			20190211164102.0
008			080731s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aNEMOTO, Kuniaki _935230
245	1	0	_aPolicy dissension and party discipline : _bthe july 2005 vote on postal privatization in Japan
260			_aCambridge, UK : _bCambridge University Press, _cJuly 2008
520	3		_aThis article examines party discipline and party cohesion or defection, offering as an illustration the rebellion over postal privatization in 2005 by members of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It explores the importance of party rules – especially the seniority rule and policy specialization for district rewards – as intervening variables between election rules and party defection in a decentralized and diverse party. It is argued that in such cases, party rules like seniority can help prevent defection. When these rules are changed, as in the postal case of 2005, defection is more probable, but it is found that the relationship between defection and seniority is likely to be curvilinear, and also that the curvilinearity is conditional upon each legislator's having different incentives for vote, policy and office
700	1		_aKRAUSS, Ellis _935231
700	1		_aPEKKANEN, Robert _935232
773	0	8	_tBritish journal of political science _g38, 3, p. 499-525 _dCambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, July 2008 _xISSN 00071234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080731 _b1431^b _cTiago
998			_a20081028 _b1010^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27175 _d27175
041			_aeng