000			01718naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8082116193710
003			OSt
005			20190211164149.0
008			080821s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWOOD, B. Dan _929623
245	1	0	_aWhat determines how long political appointees serve?
260			_aLondon, UK : _bOxford University, _cjuy 2008
520	3		_aThe president's role as chief executive depends on the quality and tenure of political appointees who assist with the constitutional charge to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." This study explores the determinants of the duration of political appointee service. Using an agency theory framework, we propose that appointee tenure depends on financial incentives, executive-legislative conflict, solidary, and material benefits offered by the president, as well as implicit incentives that differ across presidential administrations. Using Office of Personnel Management records from January 1982 through August 2003, we employ multivariate survival analysis to confirm most aspects of the theory. The results imply that the most important determinants of political appointee tenure are financial and the difficulty of public administrative service. However, the president can affect exit propensities at the margins by manipulating rewards and implicit incentives that promote loyalty to public service and the administration
700	1		_aMARCHBANKS III, Miner P _935361
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g18, 3, p. 375-396 _dLondon, UK : Oxford University, juy 2008 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20080821 _b1619^b _cTiago
998			_a20120521 _b1042^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c27300 _d27300
041			_aeng